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P.O. Box 12, 76-100, IsraelI. Introduction and Summary
Scale economy in the construction and operation of public facilities, such as land¯lls,
call for cooperation among communities to build a common facility (O'Sullivan, 1993).
Such a facility is a mixture of a public good and a private bad and, hence, leads to strong
opposition by communities to locate it in their vicinity (Frey et.al, 1996). This is one of the
most serious environmental concerns of recent years, and is known as NIMBY: "not in
my back yard." In this paper we study the hypothesis that a democratic political process
creates an adequate mechanism for the resolution of the NIMBY con°ict. The intuitive
explanation is simple. A NIMBY con°ict is likely to induce lobbying and symmetric
pressures by all threatened communities in the relevant region. As is well known (Grossman
and Helpman, 1994), when subject to symmetric pressures, politicians stick ¯rmly to
principles and are functioning most e±ciently.
The existing literature on the siting of noxious facilities has focused mainly on nor-
mative issues, such as an implementation of welfare-maximizing siting via decentralized
community-based mechanisms (e.g., O'Sullivan, 1993; and Minehart and Neeman, 2002).
However, it is evident that such mechanisms were seldom practiced (e.g. Swallow et al.,
1992). The current study adapts a positive approach, integrating a political-economic
framework with a model of a competitive real-estate market. In the theoretical section,
a government of a linear two-city economy determines the location of a noxious facility,
which a®ects the equilibrium in the real-estate market and induces the spatial distribu-
tions of price and population. The government is subject to political pressures by city-level
lobbies of landowners (both landlords and homeowners).
In general, the political equilibrium and the socially optimal siting di®er. However,
the more equitable is the distribution of home ownership in the region, the smaller the
di®erence. At the limit, when property distribution is perfectly equitable and all cities
participate in the political arena, the government locates the facility at the socially optimal
site. The analysis proceeds by identifying additional conditions, under which the political
equilibrium siting coincides with the socially optimal location and by an empirical analysis.
1In the empirical section, the theoretical framework is extended to account for a
multiple-city region, and is calibrated to assess the prospects of the political system in
resolving the NIMBY con°ict in the context of land¯lls siting in Israel. It is shown that
if all cities in the region form political lobbies and politicians are not extremely corrupt,
the political siting is close geographically to the socially-optimal location, and the di®er-
ence entails less than 0.1% reduction in social welfare. Moreover, even if the formation
of lobbying in the region is incomplete, as long as the weight the politicians award social
welfare is larger than 0.7, the proximity of the political and socially optimal locations is
preserved. We interpret the above results as supportive of the hypothesis of an e®ective
political solution to the NIMBY con°ict.
II. The Economy
Consider a two-city, unit interval region, where the cities 1 and 2 are located at the
borders, 0 and 1, respectively, and populated by N identical households. The economy is
open trade-wise, but migration is domestic only. Landowners, either absentee or residents
of the region, own land and are the suppliers of housing. Housing supply in each of the
cities, Si, is inelastic. A noxious facility like a land¯ll is located at a point x 2 (0;1). The
environmental quality in each city, 0 · ei(di) · 1, is increasing, twice di®erentiable and
concave function of the city's distance from the noxious facility, di (d1 = x; d2 = 1 ¡ x).
A. Households' Behavior
The utility of a representative household living in city i is de¯ned over a composite
consumption good, zi, with a perfectly elastic supply, which is taken as a numeraire, and
over his consumption of housing services: qi = eihi, which is proportional to one's housing
size, hi, with a proportion coe±cient ei (i.e. the environmental index). Utility is given by
Ui = zi + u(qi); i = 1;2; (1)
where u is increasing, strictly concave, and twice di®erentiable1. We assume linear trans-
portation costs and that the amount of waste produced by each city is proportional to
1 A more general formulation of the utility, u(h;e), is possible, but do not change the
main results and entails awkward arithmetics.
2it's residential area. Therefore, total cost of transporting the waste of the ith city is given
by tSidi, where t > 0, is the transportation cost per unit of housing area times a unit of
distance. The cost is recovered via uniformly state/regional tax: T = t
N(S1d1 + S2d2).
Thus, a household's budget constraint is:
I = zi + hipi + T; i = 1;2; (2)
where I is an exogenously given income and pi is the per unit housing price (including
local taxes) to be determined in equilibrium.




ei(di), which can be thought-
of as the price of e®ective housing services in the ith city. In addition, the household
allocates its limited budget between consumption of housing services and other goods.






(ri) ´ D(ri); zi = I ¡ T ¡ qiri; (3)
and the household's indirect utility function:
V i = I + u(D(ri)) ¡ riD(ri) ¡ T; i = 1;2: (4)
B. Spatial Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium in the housing market is characterized by three condi-
tions, which determine the spatial distributions of prices, population and dwellings. First,
the housing supply in each city, equals demand:
Si = nihi () Siei = niD(ri); i = 1;2; (5a)
where ni is the equilibrium number of households residing in the ith city. Second, in
equilibrium, households will be indi®erent between residing in the two cities (no migration
condition):
r1 = r2 ´ r: (5b)
3Finally, the two cities populations must add-up to the region's population:
N = n1 + n2: (5c)
Substituting (5b) into (5a) and the resultant expression into (5c) yields a single equation,
S1e1(x) + S2e2(x) = N ¢ D(r); (6)
which summarizes the equilibrium relations between r and x.
From (5b), and the de¯nition of r, it follows that
pi(di;x) = r(x)ei(di); i = 1;2: (7)
The above equation forms the hedonic price function, relating housing price to the city's
distance from the facility, di, and the facility location, x. It can also be seen as the








= rxe2 ¡ re2
d2; (8)
where subscripts denote partials. Thus, the e®ect of shifting the facility location on housing
prices is composed of two components. The ¯rst, rxei, is a general equilibrium global e®ect;







and recalling that Dr < 0, imply that sgn(rx) 6= sgn(S1e1
d ¡ S2e2
d), and that the general
equilibrium e®ect in (8) may be either positive or negative.
The second term, rei
di, is of a local nature. A city located further away from the
noxious facility enjoys a better environmental quality. The local e®ect is non-negative and
decreasing. The range for which it is positive de¯nes the NIMBY phenomenon. Empirical
studies (e.g. Goren, 1997) suggest that in the case of a land¯ll, the NIMBY e®ect extends
4to a radius of about 10 miles. For the theoretical analysis, the NIMBY phenomenon is
incorporated by assuming that rei
di > 0 8 di 2 (0;1). The observable inverse elasticity of





@di jr=const. The NIMBY assumption
implies that ´i > 0 8 di 2 (0;1). We denote ^ ´i ´ ´i ¡ ¿i, where ¿i ´ td
i
pi is the
share of transportation cost per unit of housing in the housing price. The elasticity ^ ´i
is the observable hedonic elasticity in economies where each household bears the cost of
transporting its own waste.
III. Siting Decisions
The socially optimal site maximizes the total economic surplus in the economy,
WS(x) = n1V 1 + p1S1 + n2V 2 + p2S2 = N[I + u(D(r))] + tx[S2 ¡ S1] ¡ tS2; (10)
subject to the competitive equilibrium condition in (6).
Proposition 1: Optimal Siting. Assuming an interior solution to the siting problem,
the socially-optimal location, xs, that would have been chosen by a benevolent government,
is given by
xs
1 ¡ xs =
R1^ ´1
R2^ ´2; (11a)
where Ri = piSi is the property value in city i.
Proof: The ¯rst order condition for maximization of (10) subject to (6) is given by
@W S
@x
= t(S2 ¡ S1) + NrDrrx = 0: (11b)





d2d2) < 0; is assured by concavity of ei; i = 1;2, and
(9).
Examining (11b), it is apparent that the siting decision leads to a trade-o® between
environmental quality and transportation cost. Shifting the facility from City 1 towards
City 2 reduces the environmental externalities in the ¯rst and increases them in the latter,
and at the same time the transportation cost increases in city 1 and decreases in city 2.
5Optimal siting is achieved at a location where the two cost types are optimally traded; the
marginal changes in aggregate environmental quality and total transportation costs are
equal.
Equation (11a) characterizes the optimal site in terms of empirically observable quan-
tities. It resembles Ramsy's inverse elasticity rule for optimal taxation. Like the intro-
duction of a tax, the construction of a public facility serves to produce a public good,
but creates a local loss of welfare that is proportional to the inverse of the (net) demand
elasticity. The resulting rule for optimal siting is simple: the ratio of the distances should
be equal to the inverse ratio of the net hedonic demand elasticities, each scaled by the
corresponding housing value.
The government in our analysis is, however, a political entity rather than a benevolent
planner, and its utility is a®ected by both social welfare and political rewards. The ensuing
location of the facility re°ects the interests of the participants in the political arena and
can be characterized as if it was maximizing a political support function; a weighted sum of
social welfare and lobbies' welfare. The micro foundations for a political support function
are provided by Zusman (1976) who describes policies as a solution to a Nash bargaining
game between lobbies and politicians, by Grossman and Helpman (1994) who characterize
policies as a perfect Nash equilibrium in a menu auction game, and by Finkelshtain and
Kislev (1997) who portray policies as an e±cient contract of politicians and interest groups.
In all three studies, the lobby formation is exogenous, an approach that is adopted in the
current analysis.2
Characterization of the equilibrium requires identi¯cation of groups in the economy,
that are expected to form political lobbies. For at least two reasons, formation of a tenants'
lobby is unlikely. First, since inter-cities migration is costless, an inherent con°ict does not
exist between tenants of di®erent cities and e®orts to form a tenant lobby are expected
to be dampened by free riding. Second, lobby formation involves considerable ¯xed costs
2 A formal analysis of lobby formation is presented by Mitra (1999) in the context of
trade policies.
6(Mitra 1999), while the e®ect of siting policies on tenants' welfare is minor (see Section IV).
In contrast, those who own land in a speci¯c city cannot rely on anyone but themselves
to oppose the government's intention to locate a facility near their city that is expected
to reduce the value of their property signi¯cantly. Thus, the free riding problem is much
smaller in the landowners' case than in the tenants' case. Therefore, we adopt in the
subsequent analysis the assumption that landowners will be organized in political lobbies.
Let 0 · ¯i · 1; i = 1;2, be the proportion of land owned by landowners who are
members of the ith city lobby, and let ºi · ni be the number of organized landowners who
reside in the region. The aggregate welfare of the lobby members, gross of the political
contributions, is
Wi(x) = ¯iSipi(di) + ºi[I + u(D(r(x))) ¡ r(x)D(r(x)) ¡ T(x)]; i = 1;2: (12)
The political equilibrium siting, xP, is the solution to
max
x2(0;1)
fW P ´ (1 ¡ °)W S + °(W 1 + W2); S:T: (6)g; (13)
where ° > 0 is the weight that politicians place on political contributions. Assuming an
interior solution to (13), the political siting is characterized via the ¯rst order condition:
@W P
@x







x ¡ ºi(rxD + Tx)]: (14a)
Introducing several notations, the political equilibrium site can be described in terms
of observable quantities. Let º = º
1+º
2
N be the proportion of organized landowners who








N be the proportion of organized but absentee










@pi the price elasticity for the demand of
housing services, which equals the observable price elasticity of housing demand.
Algebraic manipulation of (14a) yields proposition 2.
Proposition 2: Political Siting. Assuming that the political equilibrium lies in the
interior of [0;1], then the government's chosen site, xP, is given by
xP
1 ¡ xP =
[1 ¡ ° + °(¯1 + ®
´D)]R1´1 ¡ (1 ¡ ° ¡ °º)¿1R1
[1 ¡ ° + °(¯2 + ®
´D)]R2´2 ¡ (1 ¡ ° ¡ °º)¿2R2: (14b)
7Condition (14b) re°ects the inherent con°icts between the interests of organized landown-
ers and those of the whole society, and as ° vanishes Eq (14b) reduces to the optimal siting
rule. To grasp the intuition of the result, suppose that transportation cost is negligible.
In this case, the political siting formula is again an inverse elasticity rule, but now each
elasticity is being scaled by °(¯i+ ®
´D). Thus, ceteris paribus, in comparison to the optimal
site, the city with better political organization (larger ¯i) pushes the facility further away
towards the other city, in order to protect its members' property values.
In addition to the local interest, all landowners' lobbies have a common global interest
to raise housing prices in the economy. Getting the facility closer to a city diminishes
signi¯cantly the environmental index in the city, and as a result it reduces the e®ective-
housing supply in the economy, e1h1 + e2h2, which raises prices. The magnitude of this
e®ect is inversely related to the absolute value of the demand elasticity ´D. This global
interest may work in the same or opposite direction to the local one, and it is mitigated, if
many of the landowners are residents of the region and care for the total economic surplus
in the housing market rather than landowners' revenues. In the extreme case, when all
residents are homeowners, ® vanishes and only the local interest a®ects the political siting.
Since the focus of our analysis is the examination of the political process as a siting
mechanism, we use the characterization of the political equilibrium in equations (13)-(14b)
to study the circumstances under which the political and optimal locations agree.
Corollary
The following are alternative su±cient conditions for the coincidence of the political
equilibrium and socially-optimal siting:
(a) The existence of a benevolent government (° = 0);
(b) A symmetry in political organization (¯1 = ¯2) and 1. all lobby members are residents
(® = 0), or 2. housing demand is perfectly elastic, or 3. transportation costs are negligible
(¿1 = ¿2 = 0).
(c) All lobby members are residents (® = 0), and either transportation cost is negligible
(t = 0) or cities are of identical size (S1 = S2).
8The corollary identi¯es several circumstances with a complete political internalization
of the negative externalities. To examine further the plausibility of this later conjecture,
we turn to an empirical assessment.
IV. Land¯ll Siting in the Center and South Regions of Israel
In this section we analyze the siting of a land¯ll in Israel, to assess empirically the
main hypothesis of the paper concerning the capacity of a democratic political system
to resolve the NIMBY con°ict. The daily waste production in Israel amounts to 12,000
tons and is growing at an annual rate of 3%, which is larger than the Israeli growth rate
of GNP. The waste-treatment system is in a transition process. In 1997, the base year
for our analysis, the waste was disposed of in approximately 350 old and relatively small
land¯lls, most of which did not meet western environmental standards and were located a
short distance from the municipalities they served. In order to reform the aged system, the
government instituted a national waste disposal plan ("TAMA 16"), designed to reduce
dramatically the number of land¯lls and to dump the garbage in ¯ve (or less) large and
modern ones.
However, due to intense protests of local landowners provoked by the NIMBY phe-
nomenon, the government has failed to site most of these new waste facilities. The success-
ful lobbying against the permanent siting of a central land¯ll in Duda'im, just a few miles
south of the city of Be'er-Sheva, is a remarkable example (Shmueli and Gasul 1999). The
lobby's members, composed of landowners, developers and representatives of all political
parties in the city council, indicated the fear from reduction in the environmental quality
and the value of the city's real estate as two of the prominent reasons for their opposition.
Additional examples of landlord's campaigns against the siting of land¯lls in the vicinity
of cities in the center of Israel are documented by Feitelson (2001).
The siting of a land¯ll that would serve the center and south regions of the country
is the subject of the following analysis. In particular, we consider the major 33 cities in
this area, as listed in Table 1. In 1997 those cities were populated by 980;065 households
(around 3.1 million people) accounting for more than 72 % of the national waste output.
9A. Calibration
Calibration requires an adjustment of the theoretical model to account for a multiple-




ei; i = (1;:::;33);
33 X
i=1
siei = ND(r): (15)
Data of the population and dwelling distributions in the region, as well as the local munici-
pal taxes and the distance of each city from the nearest land¯ll are readily available and are
reported in Table 1. Calibration requires also the speci¯cation of functional forms to rep-
resent preferences and environmental technology, taking into account inter-city variability.




a + cln(di); if di · ¹ d
1; otherwise,
(16)
where a and c are positive constants, di is the distance between the center of the ith city and
the closest land¯ll and ¹ d denotes the maximum radius to which the negative environmental
impact of the land¯ll extends. The maximal potential environmental quality in the ith city
is ¹ ei as obtained in the absence of a land¯ll within a radius of at least ¹ d.
The calibration of the parameters of ei(di) follows Goren (1997), who estimates the
impact of land¯lls' proximity on housing prices in eighteen Israeli cities via hedonic price
methods. The results were veri¯ed through a contingent valuation study. Goren estimates
that ¹ d = 15;000m (m=meteres), t = $
m30:00005, and that the ratio of the price of a house
located at a distance of di meters to the price of an otherwise identical house situated at





0:0076 + 0:1032ln(di); if 1000 · di · 15;000
1; otherwise
: (17)





= 0:0076 + 0:1032ln(di): (18)
10Thus, our estimates for a and c are 0.0076 and 0.1032, respectively. This speci¯cation
implies that the hedonic price elasticity depends only on di and for di 2 [1000m;15;0000m]:
0:10 · ´i · 0:14; i 2 (1;:::;33). The (local) impact of a shift in the land¯ll location on
housing values might be signi¯cant and on average, a kilometer of distance raises prices
by 1.9%. This result compares with land¯ll e®ects in the U.S. (Farber 1998).








¹ ei : We normalize ¹ e1 = 1, where the reference city, i = 1, is
chosen to be Tel-Aviv, the city with the highest housing prices in Israel. Employing this






Households' preferences are represented by a linear demand function for housing ser-
vices: D(r) = A ¡ Br: To estimate A and B, recall that qi = hiei, and hence, the price
elasticity of demand for housing services equals the observable price elasticity of housing









@pi: Employing structural econometric
model of the Israeli housing market, Bar-Nathan et al. (1998) estimate ^ ´D = ¡0:3, imply-
ing ¡Br
A¡Br = ¡0:3. Moreover, the equilibrium conditions in (15) yield a second equation in
A and B, namely, A¡Br = 1
3:64¢109
P33
i=1 Si(pi(di)+Ti): Solving the foregoing equations
we calculate ^ A = 74:54, ^ B = 0:0046.
To examine the plausibility of the calibration procedure, the predicted population
distribution in equilibrium, ^ ni, is compared with the actual one in the region, ni; i 2
1;:::;33. We ¯nd that the correlation coe±cient between the two equals 0:97.
B. Optimal Siting
Following the declared goal of the Israeli government and the actual emerging policy,
we consider the replacement of all the land¯lls that existed in the region in 1997 with a
single, large and modern one. The optimal location of such a facility would maximize total
economic surplus in the regional housing market:




11Total social welfare, W S, for every possible location of the land¯ll in the entire region is
depicted in Figure 1a. The optimal siting is depicted in Figure 1a as point S, at longitude
= 135.0 and latitude = 128.9. This is located in an open space, de¯ned by the Israeli
Ministry of the Environment as a "low-sensitive area" suitable for development, and at
an approximately equal distance from Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem, the two metropolises in
the region. Total annual economic surplus (net of the cost of transporting the waste)
originating from housing services is then $29.2 billion.
When the land¯ll is located at S, the only cities a®ected by its negative externalities
are Qiryat Mala'hi and Bet-Shemesh, which are located less than 15 kilometers from the
designated site. The land¯ll entails an annual total loss of $0.9 million of economic surplus
in the housing markets of those two cities. The location of the land¯ll in a relative vicinity
to both metropolises of the region implies moderate transportation costs, which amount
annually to $4 million.
Thus, a carefully-situated land¯ll reduces environmental damages to a minimum, while
transportation costs are kept low. On the other hand, ine±cient siting in the proximity
of populated residential areas may diminish welfare signi¯cantly. This is exempli¯ed by a
comparison of the optimal siting with the historic multi-facility situation in Israel, which
reveals that the establishment of a single centralized land¯ll has the potential to increase
the annual welfare produced by housing services in the discussed region by $1.4 billion (5%
of the region's surplus from housing services). In other words, the environmental damages
caused by the 350 land¯lls which exist in Israel as of 1997 are huge, but most of them can
be saved by a wise siting policy.
C. The Political Arena
First, we note that the above corollary concerning the coincident of the political and
social locations remains valid in the current multi-city case. Unfortunately, however, non
of the su±cient conditions, o®ered by the corollary, is met by the Israeli reality. This
motivates the use of the Israeli data to assess empirically of our main hypothesis that the
political siting does not deviate signi¯cantly from the socially-optimal one
12We ¯rst simulate circumstances that are favorable for the political solution, under
which all private landowners in the region form political lobbies. We then proceed with a
more challenging test, examining a situation under which lobbies are concentrated in only
one metropolis. In addition, we explore empirically the in°uence of equity in property
distribution and of politicians' ethics on the siting policies.
Determination of the political equilibrium requires the knowledge of ° and the dis-
tributions of ¯i and ºi. To this end, we begin with the conceivable assumption that all
private landowners participate in lobbies, whereas public housing companies are not en-
gaged in the political arena. This implies that ¯i; i 2 (1;:::;33), equals the proportion
of privately owned land in each city, and that ºi; i 2 (1;:::;33) equals the number of
private landowners who reside in the region. Both types of information are published by
the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics and are reported in the last two columns of Table










Given the actual holding distribution in Israel, we ¯nd that the distance between the
socially optimal and political equilibrium locations depends crucially on the politicians'
ethical norms, °. Governmental ethics are expected to vary considerably across countries
and time. Accordingly, we simulate a variety of equilibria that correspond to a range of °s.
The dark blue line in Figure 1a describes the trajectory of the land¯ll political-equilibrium
location as ° ranges from 1 to 0. Figure 2a depicts the associated welfare consequences.
Starting with the extreme case, where ° = 1, the politicians' objective function coincides
with the lobbies' aggregate welfare and the single land¯ll is located at point L in the
proximity of Tel-Aviv. This location near the largest city in the region diminishes annual
welfare in about $1.04 billion, or by 3.6% of the attainable economic surplus in the housing
market. Yet, even from the society point of view, the establishment of a single land¯ll at
point L is still favorable compared to the multi-land¯lls situation, by $0.36 billion.
13To explain the reason for this location (point L), we suppose ¯rst that all landlords
are absentees. In this case, the lobbies care only about housing revenue, and the political
objective function coincides with the aggregate pro¯t of a hypothetical regional landlords
cartel. Recalling that the demand elasticity, ´D, equals 0.3, it is clear that such a cartel
would strive to reduce aggregate housing supply in order to increase housing prices and
revenues. Since housing supply is ¯xed, the available technology to lessen "e®ective housing
supply" is to locate the facility in the vicinity of concentrated residential areas. Such siting
leads to a large negative environmental impact of the land¯ll and diminishes the e®ective
housing services.
Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 1b, the aggregate annual housing rent reaches its
maximum of $6.4 billions, when the land¯ll is adjacent to Tel-Aviv, the largest metropolis
in the region. In Israel however, about 70% of residents are homeowners. Therefore,
in addition to revenue, they care also about consumer surplus, which is maximized in
locations far from Tel-Aviv, as can be seen in Figure 1c. However, since the topography
of consumer surplus (Figure 1c) is °atter than the terrain of revenues (Figure 1b), the
latter is dominating and the maximum of the sum is achieved at point L. As the level
of politicians' ethics increases, the land¯ll will gradually approach the socially optimal
location along the dark blue line. Inspection of Figure 2a, which presents the associated
welfare implications, reveals that social welfare is a decreasing parabolic function of °.
We ¯nd that the elasticity of social welfare in the politicians' ethical norms (measured by
1 ¡ °) is in the range of 0:004 ¡ 0:05.
The million-dollar question is where will the single land¯ll actually be located. To this
end, we examine some plausible estimates of ° from previous studies. We have three rele-
vant references. Zusman (1976) and Zusman and Amiad (1977) examine Israeli government
intervention in the Sugar and Dairy industries and report ° in the range 0:4 · ° · 0:6.
Recently, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) analyze the U.S. federal government trade policies
and estimate a smaller ° (by an order of magnitude), in the range 0:014 · ° · 0:019.
14Adopting the recent estimates from the U.S., we ¯nd that the political equilibrium
site coincides with the socially optimal location. Furthermore, as can be seen from Figure
2a, as long as (1 ¡ °) ¸ 0:7, the annual welfare loss associated with the political process
is negligible { less than 20 million dollars (about 0.06%). Even if we adopt Zusma's and
Zusman and Amiads' extreme estimates (° = 0:6), the political lobbying entails only a
moderate loss of welfare of less than 1.2% of the maximal social welfare.
Zusman and Amiad infer estimates from data on the government support in Israeli
agriculture during the seventies, an era characterized by domination of the agricultural
sector in the Israeli political system, as is evident from the fact that 30% of government
ministers were residents of agricultural communities, though their share in the population
was only 8%. Thus, it is safe to infer that their estimates provide an upper bound to the
actual weight that current politicians place on lobbies' welfare. Accordingly, we conclude
that: even if lobby formation among the a®ected communities is e®ective, unless politicians
are extremely corrupt, the political equilibrium site would not signi¯cantly deviate from the
socially optimal one.
Higher moral standards among politicians increase the weight of social welfare in the
political objective function. Below we demonstrate that equity in the regional holding
distribution is another factor that can bring the political siting closer to the optimal one.
The mechanism is simple. The higher the equity or equivalently the more landowners
reside in the region, the larger the weight of consumer surplus in the lobbies' objective
function, and indirectly, the larger is its weight in the political objective function. But,
ceteris paribus, the larger the weight given to consumer surplus, the smaller the deviation
of the political equilibrium site from the optimal one.
To quantify the impact of the distribution of land ownership on social e±ciency of the
siting policies, we assume ° = 1 (corrupted politicians) and simulate a sequence of political




N . In the extreme case of inequitable ownership, none of
the region's residents are homeowners and all private homeowners are absentees, namely,
15ºi = 0 8i: As aforesaid, in this case the political objective function coincides with the
homeowners' aggregate revenues, and the land¯ll is located at point L in Figure 1a. As
º increases, the distribution of land ownership becomes more equitable and the land¯ll
progressively shifts closer to point S, along the light blue trajectory in Figure 1a.
The consequent changes in social welfare, described in Figure 2b, exhibit positive
parabolic relation between W s and º, and the implied elasticity is in the range of 0:03¡0:20.
Currently, in Israel º = 0:72, and with ° = 1 the political equilibrium site is L. However,
we ¯nd that if º increases above 0.85, annual welfare losses diminish dramatically to $83
million, which is 0.3% of the total surplus. An international comparison of developed
countries reveals that the rate of home ownership ranges from 0:2 in Switzerland to 0:8 in
Italy. Thus, we conclude that the levels of equity that are required to o®set the wrongdoing
of completely corrupt politicians are above those found in most developed countries.
However, the above analysis suggests an interesting insight concerning the possible
trade-o® between equity and morality in assuring an e®ective functioning of the political
system. Figure 2c depicts the map of welfare isoquants in the (º;°) space. It can be seen
that if ° · 0:2, then a moderate degree of equity of º ¸ 0:5 will assure an e±cent political
solution with only minor annual welfare loses of less than $50 millions (0.2%). Recalling
that ° = 0:2 is larger in order of magnitude than recent estimates from the U.S., and that
the condition of º ¸ 0:5 is met by most developed countries including the U.S., we conclude
that for the range of parameters that is found in many of the developed democracies, the
political process provides a reasonable solution to the NIMBY con°ict.
To examine the robustness of this conclusion, we conduct a sensitivity analysis with
respect to variations in the value of housing price elasticity and the form of the demand
function. We ¯nd that the larger ^ ´D the closer is point L to S and if ^ ´D ¸ 0:6, the two
points coincide, implying that for any level of ° and º the political equilibrium location
is optimal. Moreover, Peng and Wheaton (1994) report that in many developed countries
the housing demand is more elastic than in Israel, strengthening our conclusion.
16To examine the restrictiveness of the maintained hypothesis of linear demand function
we employ a Box-Cox transformation{ D(r) = A ¡ B r
¸¡1
¸ . Repeated runs of the model,
where ¸ varies between 1 (a linear demand) and 0 (a logarithmic demand) reveals that the
smaller is the value of ¸ the smaller is the deviation between points L and S3. Therefore,
the linear demand function, employed in our analysis, appears to be the most challenging
speci¯cation with respect to our hypothesis.
Note that the foregoing results demonstrate that although interest groups invest re-
sources in lobbying, they create eventually only minor deviation of policies from the socially
optimal ones. This is to say, that if interest groups in the various cities could operate co-
operatively, they would probably decide to quit the political arena and save on political
contributions. However, in reality, such a cooperation is unlikely. Therefore, each of the
lobbies must be active and make a positive reward contribution to induce the government
to choose this location rather than the one that would be worse from its own perspective.
If a speci¯c lobby were to become inactive, it may ¯nd the politically determined location
of the noxious facility in its backyard, as demonstrated in the next simulation.
Speci¯cally, we simulate a situation in which only private landlords at the city of Tel-
Aviv and its neighboring cities (marked with ¤ in Table 1) are organized in politically active
lobbies. The total welfare of the lobbies' members is maximized when the land¯ll is sited
near the center of the other most populated city, Jerusalem (point T, Figure 1a). From the
lobby's members' point of view, this is the best way to decrease supply of housing services
and as a result increase r and their own revenues. The annual social welfare obtained in
that location ,W S, is lower by $686 Millions (2.35%), than its level obtained under socially
optimal siting. The location determined in the political arena however, is the one which
maximizes the weighted sum of the lobby welfare and the social welfare. We ¯nd that
if ° exceeds 0.7, then the political siting is still geographically very close to the optimal
site, and the welfare losses are negligible. This result strengthens the con¯dence that the
3 Values of ¸ greater than one results in housing-price elasticities which are smaller than
any estimation reported in the literature
17political process functions e®ectively, even if political organization is imperfect and lobby
formation is incomplete.
Recently, while revising the paper, we have learned that the Israeli National Board for
Planning and Building has decided to recommend the government to site the new central
land¯ll at Kalanit, not far from the city of Qiryat-Gat. This site is only 10 km (6 miles)
from the optimal location characterized in the paper.
References
Bar-Nathan, Moshe; Beenshtock, Michael and Haitovsky, Yoel. "The Market
for Housing in Israel." Regional Science and Urban Economics, January 1998 28(1), pp.
21-49.
Farber Stephen. "Undesirable Facilities and Property Values: a Summary of Empirical
Studies." Ecological Economics, January 1998, 24(1), pp. 1-14.
Feitelson Eran. "Malicious Siting or Unrecognized Processes? A Spatio-Temporal Anal-
ysis of Environmental Con°icts in Tel-Aviv." Urban Studies, 2001, 38(7), 1143-1159.
Finkelshtain, Israel and Kislev, Yoav. "Prices Versus Quantities: The Political Per-
spective." Journal of Political Economy, February 1997, 105(1), pp. 83-100.
Frey, Bruno S.; Oberhoizer-Gee, Felix and Eichenberger, Reiner. "The Old Lady
Visits Your Backyard: A Tale of Morals and Markets." Journal of Political Economy,
December 1996, 104(6), pp. 1297-1313.
Goldberg, Pinelopi K. and Maggi, Giovani. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical
Investigation." American Economic Review, December 1999, 89(5), pp. 1135-1155.
Goren, Tamir. "Evaluation of the External Cost Associated with Waste Treatment
Facilities." MS.c. dissertation, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, January 1997.
Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan. "Protection for Sale." American Eco-
nomic Review, September 1994, 84(4), pp. 833-850.
Kunreuther, Howard and Kleindorfer, Paul R. "A Sealed-Bid Auction Mechanism
for Siting Noxious Facilities." American Economic Review, May 1986, 76(2), pp. 295-299.
18Minehart, Deborah and Neeman, Zvika. "E®ective Siting of Waste Treatment Fa-
cilities." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Mars 2002, 43(2), pp.
303-324.
Mitchell, Robert C. and Carson, Richard T. "Property Rights, Protest, and the
Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities." American Economic Review, May 1986, 76(2), pp.
285-290.
Mitra, Devashish. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-
Run Model of Trade Policy Determination." American Economic Review, December 1999,
89(5), pp. 1116-1134.
Peng, Ruijue and Wheaton, William C. "E®ects of Restrictive Land Supply on
Housing in Hong Kong: An Econometric Analysis"." Journal of Housing Research, May
1994, 5(2), pp. 263-291.
O'Sullivan, Arthur. "Voluntary Auctions for Noxious Facilities: Incentives to Partic-
ipate and the E±ciency of Siting Decisions." Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, July 1993, 25(1), pp. S12-S26.
Swallow, Stephen K.; Opaluch, James J. and Weaver, Thomas F. "Siting Nox-
ious Facilities: An Approach That Integrates Technical, Economic and Political Consider-
ations." Land Economics, August 1992, 68(3), pp. 283-301.
Shmueli Debprah. "Con°ict Assessment: Duda'im Land¯ll." Con°ict in Planning, De-
velopment and Environment. January 1999, Ministry of Environment, Planning Division,
State of Israel.
Zusman, Pinhas. "The Incorporation and Measurement of Social Power in Economic
Models." International Economic Review, June 1976, 17(2), pp. 477- 462. Zusman,
Pinhas and Amiad, A.Amotz "A Quantitative Investigation of a Political Economy -








































































































































































































































Figure 1 – Maps of (a) annual social welfare, (b) aggregate annual landowners’ revenues, and (c) annual landowners’
consumer surpluses (billions of U.S. dollars; in 1997 dollars)W s  = -25.9ν
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Figure 2 – Annual social welfare, Ws, under political equilibrium, according to (a) γ trajectory (ν  = 0.7), (b) ν   trajectory   
(1 - γ  = 0) and (c) isoquants of Ws in the (1 – γ) :ν   plane (billions of U.S. dollars; in 1997 dollars) PREVIOUS DISCUSSION PAPERS 
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